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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No.

SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH,

M)090628-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Witnesses presented evidence of an alibi defense at trial. The evidence supports
that on the afternoon of October 3, 2007, Appellant Sherman Lynch was shopping several
miles away and could not have killed his wife. Notwithstanding the evidence, the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on the defense: it failed to advise the jury that the State
must disprove a defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and it failed to advise the jury that
Lynch had no burden of proof whatsoever where the alibi was concerned. That was
error. Under Utah law, a proper instruction is necessary since the burden of proof for
affirmative defenses in criminal cases is "counter-intuitive.' State v. Garcia, 2001 UT
App 19, | 16, 18 P.3d 1123. "This counter-intuitive nature bf thinking about self-defense
and other affirmative defenses produces the need for specia jury instructions. When the
defendant has reached the threshold to merit [defense] instructions , those instructions
must clearly communicate to the jury what the burden of proof is and who carries" it. IcL
In its response, the State does not dispute the law for affirmative defenses. Rather,
it claims the error in failing to instruct the jury here was "invited," and alibi is not a
1

defense. The State is mistaken. Defense counsel did not lead the court into error. In
addition, the Utah Legislature and supreme court have recognized alibi as a proper
defense, and the supreme court has emphasized the need for proper instructions when a
defense is in issue. The lack of instructions here resulted in prejudice.
Next, the State denies that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in closing
argument. It claims that a pregnant pause supports that the prosecutor did not wrongly
attribute a statement of confession to Lynch. The State's claim ignores the prosecutor's
words. In addition, the dramatic pause emphasized the misconduct for prejudice. This
Court may decide the issue of prosecutorial misconduct based on the record and the law.
ARGUMENTS
I. THE LEGISLATURE AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAVE
RECOGNIZED THE ALIBI DEFENSE, IN ADDITION, THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT HAS REQUIRED SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. THUS,
THE ERROR HERE WAS OBVIOUS AND COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
REQUEST PROPER INSTRUCTIONS WAS UNREASONABLE.
The State does not dispute established law requiring instructions for affirmative
defenses. See_ Br. of Appellee, Arg. I. As a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant
has the right to have "his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way" with instructions. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).] Also, "a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding an affirmative defense whenever there
is evidence providing a factual basis for the defense." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 29,
192P.3d867.
1

See also State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (a defendant "is
entitled to have the gist of his defense" in the instructions); Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d
80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (a party is entitled to instructions on his theory).
2

"Trial courts should separately instruct each jury clearly that the State must
disprove . . . affirmative defenses[] beyond a reasonable doubt." Garcia, 2001 UT App
19, f 16 (ellipsis added). Trial courts should make plain that "'the defendant ha[s] no
particular burden of proof [for the affirmative defense] but [is] entitled to an acquittal if
there [is] any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense.'" State v\ Knoll 712 P.2d 211,214
(Utah 1985) (citation omitted; emphasis in Knoll). "It follows that a defendant is not
required to establish a defense . . . beyond a reasonable douot, or even by a
preponderance of the evidence." IcL (ellipsis added). And "the jury may acquit" even if
the evidence for the defense "fell 'far short of establishing the justification or excuse by a
preponderance of the evidence upon the subject.'" IcL (citation omitted).
The State maintains the law is inapplicable here for several reasons. First, it
claims Lynch invited error when he did not object and did not propose instmctions for the
alibi defense. See Br. of Appellee, 23. Yet, defense counsel's failure to object does not
constitute invited error since a silent record is not an invitation to take action. Moreover,
the trial court has a particular duty to ensure proper instructions in the case. See_ infra,
Arg. LA. Thus, the issue here may be addressed for plain error. See Br. of Appellant,
Arg. LB. It also may be addressed for ineffective assistance of counsel. IcL
Second, the State claims that alibi is not a recognized affirmative defense under
Utah law. Br. of Appellee, 25-30. Yet the Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme Court
have recognized the defense. It is relevant, and it applied bjere. See_ infra, Arg. LB.

Third, the State claims the lack of instructions is not prejudicial. Br. of Appellee,
30-32. But prejudice exists if the trial court fails to give guidance to the jury about a
defense. See_ infra, Arg. I.C. Lynch has responded to each claim in turn.
A. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT FOR INVITED ERROR IS MISPLACED.
The State asserts invited error. It claims this Court may not review Lynch's
arguments for manifest injustice or plain error where defense counsel failed to object and
failed to offer defense instructions at trial. See Br. of Appellee, 22-23. Moreover, the
State cites to the following colloquy in connection with its claim.
THE COURT: Same question for the defendant or defense counsel, do you take
exception to any of the instructions?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Will you acknowledge there are no instructions that you have
asked for that have not been given?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
R. 285:142; Br. of Appellee, 23. The colloquy does not support application of the
invited-error doctrine.
Specifically, under Utah law, the doctrine applies if defense counsel led or invited
the trial court into the error complained of on appeal, i.e., "'if counsel, either by statement
or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection"' to a given
instruction. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, t 9, 86 P.3d 742 (citation omitted).2 In
2

See also State v. Chavoose, 1999 UT 83, \ 7, 985 P.2d 915 (the court will not
address error if the party on appeal led the court into committing that error); State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (a principal purpose of the invited-error doctrine
is to "discourage[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court") (emphasis
4

Geukgeuzian, the defendant proposed a jury instruction that (failed to contain a mens rea
element. Id^ at | 8. He "affirmatively purported" that the instruction listed the essential
elements for the offense, thereby inviting error when the trial court gave a very similar
instruction to the jury. Id. atf 12.
In State v. Winfield, the defendant actively participated injury selection and
considered the collective panel to be "absolutely" acceptably for trial. 2006 UT 4,fflf8,
18, 128 P.3d 1171. He made more than one statement accepting the panel of jurors. Id,
at Tf 18. Winfield then challenged the jury voir dire on appekl, and the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that any error injury selection was invited. Id. at f 21.

added); Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, ^ 29, 128 P.3d 47 (defendant
introduced the police report into evidence); State v. Domin^\iez 2003 UT App 158, HI!
32-33, 72 P.3d 127 (the challenged testimony "was initially elicited by defense counsel's
cross-examination," inviting the error); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2dl201, 1204-05 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (a party may not appeal a jury instruction th^t the party requested).
3

The State has cited to Geukgeuzian and Winfield for application of the invitederror doctrine. Br. of Appellee, 22-23. But those cases are pistinguishable as set forth
above. In addition, the State has cited to State v. Alfatlawi. Id. In that case, the defendant
argued on appeal that defense counsel was ineffective and the trial court erred when it
failed to give a cautionary instruction to the jury. 2006 UT App 511,fflf23-26, 153 P.3d
804. This Court disagreed and ruled that even if an instruction had been properly requested, the trial court had the discretion under statutory law to reject the instruction.
Thus, "there is no assurance the court would have given" it
addition, there was no prejudice. I(L at Tf 25. Also, the Court stated that a defendant may
not take advantage of "'error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error.5" IcL at f 26 (citation omitted). The Court in Alfatlawi stated that
the defendant confirmed instructions without objection, but the Court otherwise did not
specify the affirmative or intentional conduct that misled the trial court. See id. at ^| 26
Consequently, without more, the language in Alfatla yd regarding invited error
"can only be read to have disposed of a frivolous [] claim or what may have been a
potentially meritorious [] claim that was presented in a frivolous manner." Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989).
issue here, id_, and should be confined to the undisclosed circumstances of that case.
5

In this case, defense counsel failed to request instructions for the alibi defense.
See R. 285:85-96, 138-43. His dilatory conduct does not qualify as intentionally or affirmatively leading or inviting the trial court into error. See_ Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 (the
invited-error doctrine discourages counsel from "intentionally misleading" the trial court
into error); Black's Law Dictionary, 622 (9th ed. 2009) (invited error occurs when a party,
"through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the erroneous ruling").
Moreover, the colloquy identified by the State does not support invited error. As
the record shows, the trial court requested "'affirmative[] approv[al],'" see Br. of
Appellee, 23 (citation omitted), for a particular set of instructions. The court asked
defense counsel to confirm that he had no "exception to any of the instructions" to be
presented to the jury. R. 285:142. Defense counsel confirmed that statement. IcL\ see
also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 55, 70 P.3d 111 (if defense counsel affirmatively
approves of an instruction given to the jury, the defense may not challenge the instruction
under the manifest-injustice exception). Significantly, Lynch has not raised a challenge
on appeal to any approved instruction or any instruction presented to the jury. Likewise,
the trial court asked defense counsel to confirm that there is "no instruction^ that you
have asked for that ha[s] not been given." R. 285:142. Again, counsel confirmed that
statement. IcL Significantly, Lynch has not raised a challenge on appeal to an instmction
that was proposed and not given at trial. The record shows that defense counsel
affirmatively approved only instructions that were proposed for and/or presented at trial.

6

Since alibi instructions were not proposed or presented, see lfecord, the affirmative
approval and the colloquy have no bearing on the issue herej
The record is silent with respect to any proper instruction for the alibi defense.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that it will review an issue under the manifestinjustice exception if counsel "failed to object." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54 ("In the
past, we have reviewed an instruction" for manifest injustice "only where, instead of
objecting, counsel 'merely remained silent at trial'") (citation omitted);4 see also State v.
Alinas, 2007 UT 83, ^f 10, 171 P.3d 1046 (in most circumstances, manifest injustice is
synonymous with plain error). The manifest-injustice exception or plain-error doctrine
are applicable here: "'The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the facts of the case,5 and this duty is not fulfilled" if instructions are misleading,
confusing, or incomplete. State v. Valdez, Case No. 20030590, 2005 UT App 454, 2005
WL 2804532 (unpublished decision) (citation omitted). Wijhout proper guidance from
the trial court, the jury lacks "cthe proper framework within which it could meaningfully
evaluate'" the relevant issues in the case. IdL (citation omitted).
In this case, there was no reference to, discussion abdmt, or proposal for proper
See State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,ffi[5-7& 13-14: 63 P.3d 94 (relying on plain
eiTor where defense counsel failed to object to instructions given to the jury at trial); State
v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,ffif56-65, 992 P.2d 951 ("defensejcounsel made no objection"
to an instruction addressing unanimity and the instruction would be reviewed for plain
eiTor); State v. Has ton, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (instructions presented at trial
were manifestly unjust for reversible error where the defendant did not raise the issue in
the trial court); Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 (instructions given to the jury were insufficient
resulting in plain error in the proceedings); Utah R. Crim. PL 19(e) ("Unless a party
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction! the instruction may not be
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice").
7

instructions relating to the affirmative defense of alibi. See record, generally. In
addition, the trial court did not seek affirmative approval of an alibi instruction. For the
reasons stated in the opening brief, this Court may review Lynch's issues on appeal under
the plain-error or manifest-injustice doctrine. Br. of Appellant, Arg. I.B.(l).
B. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAVE
RECOGNIZED ALIBI AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.
Next, the State seems to claim that an affirmative defense exists only if the
defendant admits his involvement in the underlying events and the evidence offers an
explanation or justification for the conduct. Br. of Appellee, 25, 29. Based on that
assertion, the State claims that "alibi is not an affirmative defense under Utah law." Id, at
25. The State's argument is misplaced for the following reasons.
First, alibi is an affirmative defense. The dictionary defines an affirmative defense
as an assertion of facts "that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or the prosecution's claim,
even if all the allegations in the complaint are true." Black's Law Dictionaiy, 482 (9th ed.
2009); see also Br. of Appellee, 25 (same). In addition, alibi is defined as "[a] defense
based on the physical impossibility of a defendant's guilt by placing the defendant in a
location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time." Black's Law Dictionary,
84 (emphasis added). The alibi defense focuses on timing and the impossibility of the
defendant's participation. State v. Cooper, 201 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1949) (time may be
important for alibi); State v. Whitely* 110 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1941) (if the defendant's
presence "is necessary to render him responsible," the State must prove that he was part
of the case). Thus, in the context of this case, the defense applies as follows: since Lynch
8

was on his way to Costco and shopping when Pat Rothermich was struck and killed,
those facts make the prosecution's claims against Lynch impossible, even though there is
no dispute that Rothermich was the victim of an intentional homicide.
Second, the Utah Legislature has codified the alibi defense. Specifically, in a
chapter entitled "Defenses," the legislature has enacted two provisions for alibi. See
State v. Gallezos, 2007 UT 81, | 16, 171 P.3d 426 (the title of a statute is persuasive and
can "'aid in ascertaining'" the statute's "'interpretation and Application'") (citation
omitted). Section 77-14-1 states that upon request, a prosecutor shall specify "the place,
date and time of the commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1
(2008). Those facts are relevant to a defendant with an alibi defense. See Cooper, 201
P.2d at 769 (time may be important for alibi). Also, Section 77-14-2 states the following.
77-14-2. Alibi - Notice requirements - Witness lists
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who intends to
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other
time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in
writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain specific information as to the place where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to th^ defendant or his attorney,
the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom h^ proposes to establish alibi,
The prosecuting attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list provided
herein or at such other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are kiown to him, of the witnesses
the state proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be ijnder a continuing duty to
disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the
attention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to conkply with the requirements of
this section, the court may exclude evidence offered \o establish or rebut alibi.
9

However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this section.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2008); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c) (2010) (requiring the
defendant to disclose information relating to the alibi or insanity defense). This Court
has upheld the constitutionality of the above notice provision for the alibi defense stating,
"By requiring the defendant to give notice to the prosecution of his intention to rely on an
alibi as a defense, the statute prevents last minute surprises and enables the prosecution to
make a full and thorough investigation of the merits of the defense." State v. Maestas,
815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
If the legislature had intended to abolish the alibi defense, as claimed by the State,
the above statutory provisions - which identify "Alibi" by name in a chapter for
"Defenses" - would be meaningless. Reedeker v. Salisbwy, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (courts will construe a statute so that its provisions are not inoperative,
superfluous, void, or insignificant). In addition, since the alibi defense does not require
evidence of an additional element - like reasonable justification for self-defense, or
diminished mental capacity due to intoxication or distress - the legislature would have no
reason to further legislate or define the defense. As it stands, the legislature has
sufficiently and specifically recognized and codified the alibi defense in Utah law.
5

The State claims that decisions from the Utah Supreme Court recognizing alibi
"are incorrect" because the legislature abolished common law defenses in 1973 and the
legislature has not enacted any statute since that time to recognize the defense. Br. of
Appellee, 26-27 (identifying Low, 2008 UT 58, If 28; Knoll 712 P.2d at 214-15; and
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Utah 1977), as incorrect). The State has failed to
acknowledge Sections 77-14-1 and 77-14-2; thus, its argument is flawed.
10

Third, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the alibi defense.
See State v. Lanier, 11S P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989) (stating that improper evidence affected
the defendant's decision to testify and provide an alibi, whidh was important to the
defense, resulting in reversible error). In State v. Waid, it stated,, "The defense of alibi
has always been considered a legitimate and proper defense, It frequently happens that it
is the only defense an accused has." 67 P.2d 647, 651 (Utahj 1937). In State v. Whitely,
110 P.2d 337, and again in State v. Knoll 712 P.2d 211, and State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66
(Utah 1977), the court specified that alibi stands on the samd footing as other defenses
where the defendant has no burden of proof and the State must prove the absence of the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whitely, 110 P.2d at 339-40; see also Knoll, 112
P.2d at 214-15; Wilson, 565 P.2d at 67-68; State v. Brown, 3&3 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah
1963) (the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden for the alibi defense when he
commented to the jury that defendant's alibi witness failed to testify), abrogated on other
grounds as stated in State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 n.33 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Notwithstanding Utah law, the State has cited to three cases to suggest the Utah
Supreme Court has rejected alibi as a defense. See Br. of Appellee, 27-28. But see State
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994) (recognizing the supreme court requires
relevant analysis before rejecting or overruling precedent). T he cases are State v. Fulton,
742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); and Whitely, 110
P.2d 337. Br. of Appellee, 28-29. Yet in Whitely the court ruled that a defendant who
claimed alibi carried no burden of proof for the issue. H O P fed at 1^9-40. Rather the

11

burden of persuasion remained with the State for the affirmative defense. IcL The court
did not purport to overrule or reverse Utah law on the defense of alibi and it did not
purport to reject alibi as a legitimate defense in this jurisdiction. See id.
State v. Romero likewise fails to support the State's position. In that case, a jury
convicted the defendant of burglary and theft. 554 P.2d at 217. His "sole contention" on
appeal concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. IcL He
claimed the eyewitnesses to the burglary provided "conflicting testimony," and he was
not at the scene of the crime as demonstrated by evidence of his alibi. IdL at 218. The
court refused to reweigh the facts and instead considered evidence in favor of the jury's
verdict. See_ id^ In that regard, "two eyewitnesses saw the defendant enter the home and
carry away the stolen property," id^, and one eyewitness recognized him. IcL "Whether or
not the witnesses can be believed [was] for the jury to decide." IdL at 219. In addition,
the defendant's alibi amounted to a "denial" that he was present at the crime scene. Id.
"Apparently the jury did not believe" that evidence. IcL Since the court considered alibi
only in the context of Romero's sufficiency issue on appeal, the case is not relevant here.
Likewise, State v. Fulton fails to support the State's claims. In that case, the
defendant was charged with and convicted of sodomy on a child. 742 P.2d at 1210. The
State maintained the offense occurred "on or about" June 1, 1983. Id_ at 1212. On
appeal, the defendant apparently claimed the evidence was insufficient to prove the date
of the offense. See^ i(L_ Since the defendant raised an alibi defense, the supreme court
addressed the sufficiency issue in that context. It stated the alibi defense does not
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have "merit independent of whether the State can prove the statutory elements of the
crime; rather, an alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove the statutory
elements." hL at 1213. That is, the defense does not place ^n added burden on the State
to prove "the precise date of the act," and "time is not a statutory element of the offense
charged." IcL Consequently, the evidence was sufficient. Significantly, the court did not
reject alibi as a defense, and it did not alter the law requiring special instructions when
evidence of the defense is present. 6 See^id, at 1212-13.
In this jurisdiction, the defense of alibi does not purport to introduce a new
element for the State to disprove at trial. See id^ at 1213. It does not raise an additional
factual issue as with other affirmative defenses. Nevertheless, if evidence supports alibi,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction advising the jury that he has no burden to prove
the defense. In addition, he is not required to establish the defense even by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the jury may acquit even if the alibi evidence "fell 'far
short of" the preponderance standard. KnolL 712 P.2d at 214 (citation omitted).

6

See KnolL 712 P.2d at 214-15 (stating the prosecution has the burden with respect
to affirmative defenses including "lack of mental capacity and alibi") (emphasis added);
Wliitely, 110 P.2d at 339 (recognizing that a defendant has no burden of proof where the
alibi is concerned); State v. Saunders, 82 Utah 170, 22 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1933)
(articulating a form of an instruction that should be given to jhe jury when evidence is
presented for an alibi defense); Waid, 67 P.2d at 651 (an instruction ought to have been
given on the alibi defense even though the defendant "made no request" for the
instruction); State v. Hanna* 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537, 539 (1933) (the defendant "was
entitled to an instruction that if such [alibi] evidence, considered in connection with the
other evidence in the case, raised a reasonable doubt as to [tibie defendant's] guilt, he was
entitled to an acquital"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2) (2008).
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Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that trial courts should use
special instructions when evidence supports an affirmative defense. See Knoll, 712 P.2d
at 214 (stating the law on affirmative defenses is "long-standing" and has applied "in this
State both before and after the adoption of the present Criminal Code"). Early alibi cases
support the use of special instructions. See Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1046; Hanna, 21 P.2d at
539; see also Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214-15 (citing to Wilson and Whiteiy for the alibi
defense); supra, note 6, herein.
The supreme court continues to emphasize the requirement for special instructions
in cases where evidence of a defense exists. In State v. Torres, the court ruled that when
evidence of a defense is present, "a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion. It
is sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable doubt as to
any element of the crime." 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980). To that end, the trial court
must make plain to the jury that the defendant had no burden of proof in the context of
the defense, but would be entitled to an acquittal if there was any basis in the evidence to
create a reasonable doubt. Id:, see also Wilson, 565 P.2d at 67-68 (the alibi defense
"stands on the same footing" as other defenses).
In State v. Low, the court stated, "a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction
regarding an affirmative defense whenever there is evidence providing a factual basis for
the defense." 2008 UT 58, f 29. Also, the trial court has a duty to properly "instruct the
jury on the relevant law," and the duty exists even if the defendant objects to an
instruction. IdL at \ 27.
14

And in uarcia, mis uourr siatea wnen eviaence or ail altirmative defense is
present, the defendant has no burden of proof or persuasion in the matter. See 2001 UT
App 19, Tf 16. "This counter-intuitive nature of thinking about self-defense and other
affirmative defenses produces the need for special jury instructions. When the defendant
has reached the threshold to merit self-defense instmctions, those instructions must
clearly communicate to the jury what the burden of proof is ^nd who carries the burden.
Trial courts should separately instruct each jury clearly that the State must disprove selfdefense, and other affirmative defenses, beyond a reasonable doubt." M a t If 16. In
addition, a proper instruction on the State's burden for the affirmative defense must be
given even if evidence conflicts with the defense. See UL at 1} 9 (where evidence supports
that defendant may have been the aggressor, the defendant isjstill entitled to instmctions);
see also Torres, 619 P.2d at 695.
A defendant is "entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to [his]
theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it." Torres,
619 P.2d at 695. "The puipose of the instructions is to set forth the issues and the law
applicable thereto in a clear, concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand
how to discharge its responsibilities." IdL_ at 696; see also U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1
(due process); Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (same); supra, note 1, and text thereto.
The trial court failed to instruct the jury on alibi or the State's burden of proof in
the context of that defense. R. 177-195. Since no instruction was presented on the
defense, the jury had no context for properly considering alibi. See, e.g., R. 177, 184
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(advising the jury to obey the instructions, and stating the instructions embody the law for
the case). The lack of instructions supports plain error by the trial court and it supports
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request alibi instructions.
See Br. of Appellant, Arg. I. This Court may address the merits of the issue on appeal.
C. THE RECORD SUPPORTS PREJUDICE.
The State claims that even if Lynch were entitled to an instruction on alibi, he has
failed to show prejudice because the trial court gave instructions "regarding the
applicable burdens of proof." Br. of Appellee, 31. The instructions advised the jury that
it could not convict unless it was firmly convinced that the evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lynch caused Rothermich's death. SeeR. 179, 182-84, 187, 193.
The instractions advised the jury on the presumption of innocence. See^ R. 177, 179, 182
And the instructions advised the jury that since the prosecution was "the one making the
accusations in this case," R. 179, the prosecution had the burden at all times, the burden
never shifted to the defendant, and the defendant was not required to prove innocence or
to present witnesses or evidence. See_ R. 179, 182, 184. Those instructions were relevant
but insufficient.
In Torres and Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court recognized the trial
court gave several proper instructions to the jury concerning the State's burden of proof
and the reasonable doubt standard. Torres, 619 P.2d at 696; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, <j}
16. Yet in both Torres, 619 P.2d at 696, and Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, the courts ruled
the general instructions were inadequate. In Torres, the court stated it was unfair to
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require the jury to go through "a tortuous process" to understand the proper burden of
proof in the context of the affirmative defense, since an instruction on the defense would
achieve the task. Torres, 619 P.2d at 696. In Garcia, this Court recognized that evidence
of a defense requires the jury to engage in a counter-intuitivq process, where the
defendant is not required to prove the defense, but rather, he Jis entitled to an acquittal if
there is any basis in the evidence to create reasonable doubt. Garcia, 200 lUTApp 19,
^ff 16, 12 (the instructions correctly informed the jury of the prosecution's burden; yet the
instructions were not adequate). Thus, special instructions were necessary.
As in Torres and Garcia, the jury here was instructed on relevant concepts like
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of proof for the
offenses. See R. 177, 179, 182-84, 187, 193. However, the jury had no guidance on the
issues in the context of Lynch5 s alibi and the counter-intuitive nature of the burden of
proof and persuasion for that defense.
Yet the alibi evidence warranted proper consideration. The record shows that
witnesses heard the collision at about 3:20 p.m., R. 283:36, and paramedics were
immediately dispatched. R. 283:55 (it was 3:18). Lynch told officers he last saw
Rothermich at 3:00, R. 284:35-36, and then he went shopping for milk. See R. 284:38.
His shopping receipt for Costco shows that by 3:44 he had pumped and purchased 15
gallons of gas. R. 285:83; State's Ex. 86. Also, he bought milk. State's Ex. 86. While
an officer traveled the route (from the collision scene to the address where the white
pickup truck was stored to Costco) in 14 minutes, R. 285:83, mat evidence does not take
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into account the additional time that Lynch may have been in line for gas or the flow rate
for gas at Costco pumps. R. 284:112-13 (an officer did not check those facts). Moreover, according to the State's theory, after the collision Lynch concealed the white pickup
truck in a garage and then transferred to a van before continuing to Costco. See, e.g., R.
285:158 (prosecutor's argument). Those tasks would have taken additional time, and a
properly informed jury likely would have reconciled the timing issues in Lynch's favor.
Without proper alibi instructions, the jury had no opportunity to consider the
defense, thereby denying Lynch of the defense. See e.g., Aly, 782 P.2d at 550 ("A
criminal defendant is entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the instructions
given to the jury"); see also supra note 1, and text thereto. Moreover, even though the
instructions generally and correctly advised the jury on the State's burden of proof, there
is no reason to believe that the jury even considered the defense; or that it somehow knew
- intuitively - that Lynch had no burden of proof or persuasion where his defense was
concerned. See, e.g., Torres, 619 P.2d at 695-96; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ 12, 16.
Since the jury received no instructions relating to the alibi defense and the parties'
burdens in that context, the void undermines confidence in the jury process, resulting in
prejudice. Lynch was deprived of his defense at trial. On that basis, this Court may
review the issues for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel and reverse the
convictions for a new trial.
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II. THE STATE POINTS OUT THAT THE PROSECUTOR USED A
PREGNANT PAUSE AND A RAISED INFLECTION WHEN SHE
CLAIMED LYNCH CONFESSED. THOSE FACTORS FURTHER
SUPPORT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
A. THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND AUDIO SUPPlORT MISCONDUCT.
The prosecutor engaged in misconduct in this case wljen she represented to the
jury in closing arguments that Lynch confessed to the homicide . The prosecutor stated
that when Lynch encountered "his best friend" at the hospita after Rothermich died, he
walked up to his friend and said, '"what have I - what am I going to do without her?
What have I done?' He killed his wife." R. 285:193. Yet the prosecutor misquoted
Lynch. He did not confess. According to the record, when Lynch's friend, Don Carter,
saw Lynch at the hospital, Lynch stated, '"What have I,' theq immediately corrected and
said, 'What am I going to do?5" R. 284:67, 78.
The prosecutor's statement of a confession called to the attention of jurors matters
they would not be allowed to consider in determining the verdict. See State v. Todd,
2007 UT App 349, f 22, 173 P.3d 170. Moreover, the jury likely was influenced by the
remarks for prejudice. Br. of Appellant, 44-47. The State disagrees.
First, it claims the prosecutor's statement may qualify s a reasonable inference.
See Br. of Appellee, 33, 35. That is, according to the State, ir the defendant does not
confess, it is reasonable for a prosecutor to make a claim in closing argument that he did.
Yet, the prosecutor's claim of a confession - where no confession exists - distorts the
truth-seeking process and is antithetical to the law of confessions. Indeed, some forms of
evidence may lend themselves to reasonable inferences. However, "[a] confession is like
19

no other evidence." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). It is personal
"'damaging evidence5" against the defendant. IcL (citation omitted). In this case the
prosecutor's statement or "inference" (Br. of Appellee, 35), was not supported by the law
or facts, and it was not reasonable since Lynch also said to his friend, "I don't lmow what
I'm going to do. Pat's dead." R. 284:67. Context supports that Lynch likely would have
completed the other statement similarly, i.e., "What have I . . . got to live for"; "What
have I . . . got to look forward to." Instead, the prosecutor completed the phrase in the
most damaging way possible to Lynch. R. 285:193. That was unreasonable and improper.
Second, the State claims a prosecutor has "considerable latitude" in closing
argument and may discuss the evidence from her perspective. Br. of Appellee, 33. Yet
the prosecutor's latitude is not unrestrained. See_ Todd, 2007 UT App 349, Yi 17-18;
ABA Stds for Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Std 3-1.2(c) (3d
ed. 1993) (a prosecutor must "seek justice, not merely" to convict); icL_ cmt. (a prosecutor
must "guard the rights of the accused as well as" enforce the rights of the public). A
prosecutor may not allude to or suggest matters that are not supported by the evidence.
Todd, 2007 UT App 349, \ 22; Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.4(e) (2010). Since Lynch did
not confess, the prosecutor's claim to the contrary violated the law.
Third, according to the State, when the prosecutor made the statement in closing
argument, she "was not actually quoting Defendant at all." Br. of Appellee, 34. The
State's assertion is puzzling since the prosecutor unquestionably attributed the statement
to Lynch. R. 285:193. Her final argument to the jury was as follows: "I'm going to end
20

with two statements, both of them by the Defendant." R. 28J5:193. Thereafter, she stated,
Lynch "walk[ed] up" to his best friend and "the first thing he says [is 'wjhat have I what am I going to do without her? What have I done?' He filled his wife." I(L (emphasis added). The prosecutor ascribed the emphasized statement to Lynch and identified
it as a confession. IcL Nevertheless, the State claims that the prosecutor's words spoken in plain English - do not actually represent what they say because the prosecutor
paused for "five full seconds" immediately before she made ^he emphasized statement,
and she raised her inflection for the statement. Br. of Appellee, 35. While the Court may
review the statement for itself, a pregnant pause and raised inflection serve to highlight
and dramatize the phrase. See, e.g., 24 George T. Patton, Jr., \Indiana Practice Series,
Appellate Procedure § 11.2 (3d ed. 2001, current through 20(19-2010) (advising attorneys
to change their tone for emphasis in argument); 2 Rosen, et al ., Michigan Practice Guide:
Civil Trials and Evidence, § 15:160 (2003) ("'Pregnant pauses' often add emphasis")
The prosecutor's emphasis of the phrase does not mitigate the misconduct.
ist's punctuation is
Fourth, the State is correct in its argument that the tran^cnptionist
not sacrosanct. See_ Br. of Appellee, 37-3 8.7 In this case theprosecutor did not indicate
punctuation when she spoke. Nevertheless, common usage ar|Ld grammar suggest
quotation marks where the prosecutor attributed statements to Lynch. See William
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See United States v. Ricks, 116 F.2d 455, 459 n. 5 (4th (fair. 1985) (stating "[t]he
punctuation of a transcript is ordinarily a matter left to the discretion and usage of the
court reporter"); People v. Hmzins, 38 Cal.4th 175, 131 P.3d 995, 1008 (2006) (courts
"are not bound by the punctuation supplied by the court reporter"); Eaton v. State, 192
P.3d 36, 59 n.3 (Wyo. 2008).
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Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style. 36-37 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing use of
quotation marks). With or without the transcriptionist's quotation marks, the
prosecutor's statement of a confession was improper.
Fifth, the State is correct in that there should have been "some reaction from"
defense counsel or the trial court when the prosecutor improperly attributed a confession
to Lynch. Br. of Appellee, 36. However, since defense counsel and the trial court did
not react to the misconduct, Lynch has been forced to raise the issue under the plain-error
and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrines. See_ Br. of Appellant, Arg. II.B. This
Court may address the issue on the merits under either doctrine.
B. THE RECORD SUPPORTS PREJUDICE.
The State claims any error in closing argument was harmless based on the
following. Lynch purchased a truck that he stored in another location; the truck was
damaged "in ways matching the collision"; paint from the truck ended up on
Rothermich's clothes; Lynch lied to a girlfriend and he misled the police about the
girlfriend; Lynch lied to police about the truck; he was emotional after Rothermich's
death, alternating between hysteria and dispassion; and he discussed "a financial payout."

8

The State claims that Lynch himself should have objected in closing argument.
Br. of Appellee, 36. But Lynch was represented by counsel. He had every right to
expect that his attorney would look out for his best interests and make proper objections.
See State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) (an attorney has a duty to represent
a client with zeal and loyalty; "defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of their
attorneys to protect their interests"); ABA Stds for Crim. Justice Prosecution Function
and Defense Function, 4-1.2, 4-3.6 (3d ed. 1993). The State's attempt to shift the
responsibility to Lynch is an implicit admission that counsel failed to do his job: if Lynch
was required to object, it was because counsel was ineffective.
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Br. of Appellee, 39-40.
Yet the evidence here was circumstantial and conflicting. See Br. of Appellant,
33-36 (discussing evidence). Among other things, no witness saw the incident. R.
284:10; 285:130. Officers collected samples from the truck mid no sample could be
connected definitively to the collision. R. 285:20-23 (hair and swabs from the truck
could not be connected to Rothermich); R. 285:21-23, 27 (Rothermich's DNA was not on
the truck). Damage to the truck did not line up exactly with injuries to Rothermich. See_
Br. of Appellant, 34. Evidence of a tow hook on the truck wis unclear. See_ R. 283:13536 (stating "[you c]an't see" the tow hook in the State's Ex. 41); see also State's Ex. 41;
R. 285:19, 27-28 (an expert examined the truck expecting to find something to cause the
I
leg wound; he made no mention of a tow hook). Also, canned and automotive paints are
manufactured in bulk, and cannot be matched with accuracy. SeeR. 284:181, 202. The
State has made reference to other facts to suggest guilt. For example, the State claims
Rothermich suffered "trauma to the back" of the head. Br. of Appellee, 3 (citing R.
283:59). Yet the medical examiner stated she suffered traum^ to the "forehead and on the
side of her head [with] associated bleeding" on her brain, R. 84:27, and the injury was
due to "direct impact with an object or the ground." M ; State's Ex. 96.
Moreover, evidence relating to the "girlfriend" (Br. of Appellee, 39), Nancy Scott,
supports that Scott was upset at Lynch, and therefore, motivated to hurt him. See R. 284:
127-28. Also, Lynch's emotional state after hearing about Rothermich's death may not
have been out of the ordinary. See R. 284:60-61 (Lynch had § difficult time processing
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information about his wife's death, and people react differently when told that a spouse
has died); 284:76-77. And evidence of the fortune cookie predicting financial gain had
no bearing on the issues since Lynch knew he stood to gain nothing from his wife's
death. See, e.g.. State's Ex. 94 at 27:20 (Rothermich left everything "to her kids").
Where the evidence is conflicting and circumstantial, there is a greater likelihood
that jurors were influenced by the misconduct, and in that instance, the error is
prejudicial. See_ State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991) (jurors may be especially
influenced by misconduct when evidence is conflicting and "susceptible of differing
interpretations") (citation omitted); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984).
This Court may order reversal for the prosecutorial misconduct. In the alternative, if this
Court reverses the conviction for the reasons set forth in Point I, it may choose to deal
briefly with the issue of prosecutorial misconduct to give guidance to the trial court and
the prosecution for purposes of the new trial. See State v. BelL 710 P.2d 100, 107-08
(Utah 1988) (where the appellate court has ordered retrial, it may address remaining
issues briefly for the guidance of the trial court); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah
1986).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Lynch respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the convictions and remand this case for a new trial.
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